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Welcome to the hotel California…. You can [try to] check-
out any time you like, but you can never leave!
—Eagles, Hotel California
Nothing is easier than pointing fingers at policymakers work-
ing feverishly at 2 a.m. to contain a rapidly spreading financial 
crisis. Rarely has this been truer for the European Union than 
during the current crisis’s amateurish policy management. Yet, 
what really matters is the final result, which is far more posi-
tive for Europe than the ugly sausage-making process.1 
In this policy brief I take the premise that the current 
European crisis is principally fiscal in nature and argue that 
1. This policy brief is based on postings by the author on the Peterson Institute 
RealTime Economics Issues Watch between March and May 2010, where they 
benefited greatly from the advice of Steve Weisman. RealTime is available at 
www.piie.com/realtime. 
during the weekend of May 8–9, 2010 European leaders craft-
ed a very important and constructive political “grand bargain” 
between EU member states and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) with far reaching, positive implications for the credibil-
ity of the European Union’s fiscal policy framework and the 
long-term sustainability of European government finances. I 
further illustrate that if Greece is ultimately forced to default 
on its debts, it is certain the Greek government would want 
to do it within the eurozone. 2 As such, a Greek default poses 
no risk to the composition of the eurozone, which consider-
ing that a German departure is equally unlikely is a secure 
monetary union. I conclude with a set of required next steps 
for Europe.
EuropE’s Crisis ManagEMEnt
Preventing  financial  crises  from  spreading  always  requires 
decisive  action  from  policymakers  and  a  “big  number”  to 
completely dispel financial market’s uncertainties about the 
political will to act. The reason for this is simple. To function, 
financial  markets  require  something  to  disagree  on.  There 
must always be two sides to a trade, and for transactions to 
take place (and price volatility to emerge), buyers and sell-
ers need to disagree on the price of an asset. However, in a 
financial crisis, invariably characterized by herd-like behavior 
by financial-market participants, everyone becomes convinced 
about the imminent financial collapse of companies, banks, 
or even countries. As such, policymakers need to put together 
“an overwhelming official response” to change the minds of 
a sufficiently large number of market participants to stabilize 
asset prices.
Unfortunately for Europe’s ability to act in a financial 
crisis, EU institutions are, as a direct result of their unique 
regional  supranational  composition,  extremely  ill-suited  to 
produce  a  “decisive  response”  to  communicate  to  financial 
2. As laid out in Cline (2010) and Mussa (2010), a credible technical debt dy-
namic case can be made that under some scenarios Greece may not ultimately 
have to default on its debts. However, factoring in likely political pressures in 
both Greece and the eurozone, I do believe that a Greek default is the most 
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markets. Consider the usual list of attendees at an ECOFIN 
Council meeting: finance ministers of 27 sovereign member 
states, three members of the European Commission, president 
of the ECB, president of the European Investment Bank, and 
the two chairmen of the European Commission’s Economic 
Policy  and  Economic  and  Financial  Committees.3  Each  of 
the 27 member states will have their own legitimate national 
interests to defend at any EU “crisis solution summit,” where 
the cost of ending the crisis will be distributed. Lastly, each 
of these meetings is overseen by the representative of the six-
month rotating EU presidency,4 guaranteeing that no “insti-
tutional crisis management experience” is accumulated within 
EU institutions. 
Simply put, there is no “US Treasury Secretary (or staff) 
at the end of the negotiating table” to take the final decision 
in Europe. Instead, any European decision to act in a crisis 
must by definition be a political compromise between large 
numbers  of  different  actors.  Meanwhile,  given  the  partici-
pation  of  multiple  sovereign  governments,  each  with  their 
individual democratic mandates to defend at meetings where 
the “bill is split among member states,” the imposition of 
any degree of “message discipline” during a European crisis 
response process is both impossible and potentially politically 
illegitimate. 
As a result, this European crisis management has been 
(and any future European crisis responses is doomed to like-
wise be) characterized by a plethora of often conflicting policy 
positions, leaks to the press, and public policy trial balloons 
carried out by the representatives of individual member states, 
the ECB, and other EU institutions.5 This might be good for 
3. See, for instance, the attendee list for the May 18, 2010 ECOFIN Council 
meeting at www.consilium.europa.eu.
4. During the first half of 2010, the rotating presidency of the European 
Union has been with Spain, one of the EU member states most affected by the 
contagion from Greece.
5. The disastrous and amateurish unilateral German announcement of a “ban 
on naked shorts” on May 18, 2010 as part of the domestic German political 
process of securing parliamentary approval, Germany’s national participation 
on the EU crisis response is probably the best example hereof. As part of 
the German parliamentary discussion, a “political link” was created between 
day-traders but inevitably leaves the impression of a paralyzed 
European Union unable to respond and might lead financial 
markets to the erroneous conclusion that Europe’s crisis solu-
tions lack credibility.
In this situation, if becomes crucial for outside observers 
and financial markets to largely ignore this messy EU policy-
making process and the associated media chatter and instead 
focus on what is actually agreed among the EU members and 
institutions in the form of written compromises of the EU 
Council or eurozone communiqués. 
Here,  a  different  picture  of  European  policymaking  is 
clearly visible: certainly, a process filled with policy U-turns 
and reversals of previous positions but also one characterized 
by rapid learning, pragmatism, and genuine policy innovation.
Consider how all of Europe’s numerous and often poorly 
timed policy reversals during this crisis between February and 
May 2010 have been in the “right direction.” On February 
11, 2010 European leaders started with their vague promises 
to  “take  determined  and  coordinated  action,  if  needed,  to 
safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole” with 
no euro figures mentioned and no International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) involvement.6 Yet, on May 9, 2010, EU lead-
ers concluded with a European Financial Stabilization Facility 
(EFSF) worth up to €750 billion (assuming an additional 50 
percent  IMF  participation)  “subject  to  strong  conditional-
ity…on terms and conditions similar to the IMF.”7 
In other words, in three months European leaders went 
from “no number and no IMF involvement” to the required 
“big number with 100 percent IMF conditionality” for all 
the money involved. Considering that this is the first “2 a.m. 
before the markets open moment” for European institutions 
since the launch of the euro in 1999 and the numerous insti-
tutional challenges for the European Union to produce an 
effective crisis response, this is a remarkable and very posi-
tive outcome of a messy process. It is furthermore difficult to 
imagine a stronger endorsement of existing multilateral finan-
cial organizations in the form of the IMF than the willing-
ness of large eurozone governments to quite literally commit 
hundreds of billions of taxpayer’s money to other eurozone 
members exclusively under IMF conditionality.
participating in the €750 billion EU crisis response and punishing financial 
speculators. This led to the unilateral German ban, which has no chance of be-
ing effective as naked short-sellers will simply move out of Germany; appeared 
to split the European Union at a crucial point during the crisis management; 
and gave the impression that the German government was merely papering 
over the real underlying problem, namely the undercapitalization of the Ger-
man (and eurozone) banking system and its related vulnerability to losses on 
Greek debt.
6. See EU Council Statement at www.consilium.europa.eu.
7. See ECOFIN Council Statement at www.consilium.europa.eu. 
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EuropE’s “grand Bargain”
Of far larger long-term importance, European leaders have 
produced a very constructive political “grand bargain” between 
the ECB, on the one hand, and the EU (especially eurozone) 
member states, on the other, concerning the future of Euro-
pean monetary union. 
To understand how the ECB can credibly negotiate far 
reaching “political deals” with its own sovereign owners among 
the EU member states,8 its uniquely independent institutional 
status must be recalled. Unlike the central bank of any indi-
vidual nation, the ECB’s independence is guaranteed by the 
European Union’s governing Treaty,9 which no individual EU 
member state government can change on its own.  
Contrasting further with say the US Federal Reserve or 
the Bank of England, both of which owe their current degree 
of independence to reversible decisions by their own national 
governments and parliaments, the ECB cannot be ordered to 
do anything against its will by any single EU political leader (or 
groups of EU leaders).10 Moreover, as this crisis has shown, the 
ECB Governing Council is willing to take controversial deci-
sions without unanimity (in principle the ECB takes decisions 
through regular majorities on its Governing Council) indicat-
ing  that  the  national  representatives  of  any  single  eurozone 
member can at anytime be outvoted on the Governing Council. 
Consequently, it can credibly negotiate with EU member states 
as an independent actor and need only enter into bargains that 
a majority of its own Governing Council approves of.
8. In theory, the owners of the ECB are all 27 EU member states through 
their national central banks. Ownership is calculated using a key that, equally 
weighed, reflects the respective country’s share in the total population and 
EU GDP. National shares are adjusted every five years and whenever a new 
country joins the European Union. Only the 16 eurozone members have “fully 
paid-up capital subscriptions” to the ECB and a seat on the ECB governing 
board. The European Union’s 11 non–euro area member states’ central banks 
must contribute to the operational costs incurred by the ECB in relation 
to their participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) by 
providing a minimum percentage of their total subscribed capital. These con-
tributions at the current eurozone and EU memberships represent 7 percent of 
non-eurozone members’ total subscribed ECB capital, or about €120 million 
out of the ECB’s total current fully paid-up capital of just over €4 billion. For 
details, see ECB, Capital Subscription, available at www.ecb.int.
9. Article 130 states clearly that “When exercising the powers and carrying out 
the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of 
the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a national 
central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or 
take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any 
government of a Member State or from any other body” (Official Journal of the 
European Union 51, May 9, 2008, available at www.ecb.int/ecb/legal).
10. Article 127 lays out how the EU Council may, through a unanimous 
vote and after consultations with the European Parliament and the ECB itself 
“confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.” 
For its part of Europe’s grand bargain, the ECB during 
the night of May 9, 2010 agreed to move beyond its mini-
malist “we care only about price stability” Bundesbank legacy 
(and did so probably against the votes of the Germans on the 
Council) and instead agreed to become a credible “lender of 
last resort” and crisis manager for the entire eurozone by grant-
ing its own Governing Board the ability to buy at its volition 
essentially any asset—public or private—it wants through its 
new Securities Market Program (SMP).11 In addition to this 
critical shift in its policy stance, the ECB previously on May 3 
had also reversed itself by agreeing to accept as collateral in its 
credit operations securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek 
government, irrespective of the credit rating.12
With the new powers the ECB essentially granted itself 
and its demonstrated willingness to use them (the ECB has 
bought a total of €40.4 billion worth of securities through the 
SMP during the first four weeks13), the ECB now has the abil-
ity to counter the risk of a sudden freeze of European credit 
markets, similar to what occurred immediately following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As a result, 
the ECB is now in far better shape to address any immediate 
financial panic, following a likely Greek default or any other 
unforeseen adverse future financial event in the eurozone. It is 
important to keep in mind that the ECB has given itself a tool 
to effectively deal with economic crises—in its own words:
“The  objective  of  this  programme  [the  SMP]  is  to 
address the malfunctioning of securities markets and 
restore  an  appropriate  monetary  policy  transmission 
mechanism.”14
As such, the ECB has never agreed to conduct a policy of 
quantitative easing (QE) in the eurozone. Consequently, recent 
11. The ECB leadership on May 10 pledged to “conduct interventions in 
the euro area public and private debt securities markets (Securities Markets 
Program) to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments that are 
dysfunctional. The objective of this program is to address the malfunctioning 
of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. The scope of the interventions will be determined by the Govern-
ing Council.” The ECB pledged to sterilize these interventions and has to date 
done so via collecting one-week fixed-term deposits corresponding to the size 
of the SMP of €40.4 billion to date (June 11, 2010). For details, see ECB, 
Open Market Operations, available at www.ecb.int.
12. “ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or 
guaranteed by the Greek government,” press release, May 3, 2010, available 
at www.ecb.int. On May 10, the ECB further agreed to offer full allotments 
of its 3- and 6-month regular long-term refinancing operations, as well as in 
collaboration with the US Federal Reserve reactivate temporary liquidity swap 
lines aimed at providing US dollar liquidity.
13. The ECB publishes only the total sum of its weekly security purchases 
under the SMP, not the precise composition hereof or the counterparties. The 
ECB’s weekly financial operations are available at www.ecb.int.
14. See ECB, Open Market Operations, available at www.ecb.int.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 4   j u Ne   2 0 1 0
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critique15  from  financial  markets  that  the  ECB  is  gradually 
phasing out the SMP, since it has been gradually reducing its 
weekly SMP purchases (€16.3 billion in week 1, €10.4 billion in 
week 2, €8.8 billion in week 3, and €4.9 billion in week 4 [last 
week of available data]),16 is totally misguided (and potentially 
directly self-serving, as big financial-market participants have 
a clear incentive to try and sell their own risky, for instance, 
Greek debt to the ECB in the secondary market, thereby reduc-
ing their own exposure through a straightforward risk transfer 
from the private to the public sector). 
Crisis management tools do not equal sustained QE, as 
conducted by, for instance, the Bank of England and Federal 
Reserve, and if the ECB deems selected securities markets to 
be less dysfunctional at present, its Governing Council should 
reduce such purchases to zero soon. In doing so, it is acting 
precisely in accordance with its previously stated policy goals 
and in a manner that has no implications on its future free-
dom to intervene in financial markets in a crisis or on other 
aspects of the European crisis response.
Contrary to claims that the ECB has lost credibility via its 
frequent policy reversals, recent events represent a quantum leap 
forward in the ECB’s ability to act as a Europe-wide financial 
crisis manager. It has in the process shown admirable flexibility 
and willingness to reverse itself when facts so demanded.
The  crucial  and  politically  more  important  question, 
however, is what the EU member states contributed to the 
European  grand  bargain.  First,  as  described  above,  EU 
members and eurozone members in particular agreed among 
themselves to put up a total of €500 billion for the EFSF.17 
The new EFSF consists of two parts. The first is an expan-
sion of the existing European Commission balance of payments 
(BoP) facility for non-eurozone members by €60 billion in new 
money guaranteed through the EU budget by all 27 member 
states. Combined with the current uncommitted €35 billion 
15. See, for instance, “Doubts on ECB Bond Buying,” Financial Times, June 
8, 2010, 24.
16. See footnote 13 for source.
17. See ECOFIN Council Statement, available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu.
(out of a total of €50 billion) from the pre-existing BoP facility, 
which has now been made available to all EU member states, 
the European Union has an immediate total of €95 billion 
available to fight the financial crisis. Combined with a prob-
able additional 50 percent contribution from the IMF to any 
intervention, the number is around €145 billion. That would be 
a sufficiently “big number” to deal in the short to medium term 
with even a Greece-like scenario in another small EU member 
state (e.g., Portugal, Ireland, or Belgium).
The other part of the EFSF consists of a €440 billion 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) consisting of pooled bilateral 
guarantees from the 16 eurozone countries. Due to the bilat-
eral nature of the pooled guarantees, some “implementation 
risk”  has  surrounded  this  pledge.  This  has  been  displayed 
most prominently in Germany, which as the eurozone’s largest 
economy and the European Union’s traditional paymaster will 
shoulder the biggest potential burden of up to $187 billion 
from this grand bargain.18 
As  such,  the  historical  importance  of  the  speedy  May 
21, 2010 approval by the German Parliament of this measure 
should  not  be  underestimated  or  get  lost  in  the  regretful 
(but  necessary  for  domestic  German  parliamentary  tactical 
reasons) announcement of the unilateral attempt to outlaw 
“naked short” trading.19 In all but name, the larger SPV-part 
of the EFSF amounts to a “joint eurobond usable only in a 
crisis,” which at such time provides weaker eurozone members 
access to financing through the fiscal credibility of stronger 
eurozone members. It is German acceptance of this fact that 
really matters.
Moreover, as the BoP facility is the “first line of defense” 
and deals with small members, the €440 billion SPV is best 
thought of as the “big member state eurozone crisis response 
mechanism.”  This  matters  tremendously  for  the  political 
credibility of the SPV, as it would only be called upon if any 
of  the  large  eurozone  members,  e.g.,  Spain  or  Italy,  faced 
an imminent Greece-style descent into financial chaos. The 
18. See Jacob F. Kirkegaard, “Europe Rises to the Occasion, but the World 
Shares the Cost,” RealTime Economic Issues Watch, May 11, 2010, available 
at www.piie.com/realtime, for details on how to estimate the combined 
contribution of Germany through the bilateral €440 billion SPV, €60 billion 
BoP facility, and the probable €250 billion IMF contribution. These estimates 
exclude the possible 20 percent additional German participation in the €440 
billion SPV laid out in the final agreement; see footnote 20 for a detailed 
description.
19. See Alan Crawford, “Germany to Ban Naked Short-selling at Midnight,” 
Bloomberg.com, May 18, 2010, available at www.bloomberg.com. It is 
important to note that while the main German opposition party, the SPD, 
abstained in the parliamentary vote, it did so not because it was opposed to 
Germany’s participation in the EFSF. The SPD abstained because there was no 
specific link in the legislation to also tax private financial firms. See “Merkel 
Pushes Euro Rescue Deal Through Parliament,” Speigel Online International, 
May 21, 2010, available at www.spiegel.de. 
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precise details of how the SPV becomes operational are less 
important.20 Given that the sovereign default of either Spain 
or Italy would trigger a eurozone-wide if not global financial 
meltdown, the actual political risk that in a “2 a.m. crisis 
scenario” the SPV (with probable additional 50 percent IMF 
participation) would not be politically approved is effectively 
zero. Knowing the truly catastrophic—and far worse than in 
the case of Greece—alternative to approval, Europe’s politi-
cians would, if ever asked, blink and authorize disbursements 
from the SPV (subject, as mentioned, to IMF conditionality).
The second part of EU member states’ contribution to the 
grand bargain, however, is far more important than the first. 
Here it is immediately evident that European “fiscal union” 
and  massive  regular  institutionalized  intra-European  fiscal 
transfers among the member states are not part of the deal. 
They are simply not possible for the reason that no revision 
of the EU Treaty (which would be required for this scenario 
to  unfold)  that  makes  such  a  fiscal  union/institutionalized 
regular transfers a reality will ever be ratified by all the 27 EU 
member states or indeed even by the key eurozone members 
themselves.
Rather than a “fiscal union,” what member states have 
contributed to the grand bargain is a “fiscal straitjacket” and 
“legislated deflation,” as we have so far seen in Latvia, Ireland, 
Greece  (too  late  of  course),  Spain,  Portugal  and  (less  so) 
Italy,21 where governments have cut public wages—wages in 
20. The EFSF will function as a limited liability company (an SPV) under 
Luxembourg law (Société Anonyme) to collect funds and provide loans in 
conjunction with the IMF to cover the financing needs of euro area member 
states in difficulty. The shareholding of each member state in the EFSF will 
correspond to its respective share in the paid-up capital of the ECB, and 
the EFSF will become operational once a critical mass of member states, 
representing 90 percent of shareholding, has completed the relevant national 
parliamentary procedures. To improve the ultimate credit rating of the SPV, 
each member state will be liable for up to 120 percent of its prorata share to 
avoid low-rated individual eurozone members dragging down the credit rating 
in a crisis (for instance, the inclusion of low-rated Portuguese or Slovakian 
guarantees to assist another eurozone member impairs the overall rating of the 
SPV to below AAA). For details, see “Terms of reference of the Eurogroup: 
European Financial Stability Facility,” Luxembourg, June 7, 2010, available at 
http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu. Despite its Luxembourg incorpora-
tion, the German Finance Agency will be responsible for German government 
debt sales, which will separately sell debt on behalf of the EFSF. See Brian 
Parkin, “German Finance Agency to Sell Bonds for Euro Fund,” Bloomberg.
com, June 8, 2010, available at www.bloomberg.com. 
21. Qualitatively, the Italian austerity program is less impressive than other 
Europe have proved far less sticky in this crisis than economic 
theory would predict—and taken a host of other fiscal auster-
ity measures. The sheer number of new austerity measures 
announced in Europe since May 10 is indicative of the new-
found political willingness of affected eurozone governments 
to finally address their long-standing fiscal issues, as well as 
move  more  aggressively  on  the  equally  important  issue  of 
fundamental structural reforms of labor markets, pension, and 
healthcare systems.
The  volte  face  of  the  Spanish  leftwing  government—
just days after the grand bargain was announced—to likely 
commit political suicide by cutting public wages and freez-
ing pensions suggests that this new willingness to “take the 
austerity pain no matter the political costs” among eurozone 
governments should be taken far more seriously than before. 
What the world will get from Europe is coordinated fiscal 
austerity and essentially a move “back to Maastricht Treaty 
basics.” With  deficits  so  severely  restricted,  Europe’s  grand 
bargain will shift the continent decisively away from Keynes-
ian economics. Moreover, as illustrated by the recent victory 
of the most fiscally austere party in the Dutch election in early 
June 2010 (the first national election in the European Union 
after the May 10 grand bargain), these fiscal policies have 
revealed public appeal in Europe.22
Moreover,  the  recent  announcement  by  the  German 
government of additional austerity measures worth a total of 
€26.6 billion from 2011 to 2014 (about 1 percent of GDP),23 
intended  to  focus  mostly  on  structural  spending  cuts  to 
welfare payments and reduction in the public sector, clearly 
shows that new austerity measures in Europe will not just be 
concentrated among the weakest Southern eurozone member 
states. With anchor-country Germany clearly intent on “lead-
ing by example,” all other eurozone member states with long-
term fiscal sustainability issues (including France and indeed 
most  other  eurozone  members  with  the  possible  exception 
of Luxembourg, Finland, and Slovakia) will be under strong 
economic pressure to follow suit to avoid a further widening 
of long-term bond market spreads between say French and 
German  10-year  bonds—at  the  time  of  writing,  50  basis 
points.24 Such widening sovereign spreads, which are likely 
European crisis austerity packages with up to 40 percent of the fiscal impact 
coming from new revenues, most of which are from the dubious category of 
“fighting tax evasion.” See Boeri and Bordignon (2010) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the Italian program.
22. See Jacob F. Kirkegaard, “Austerity Proves Popular Among European Vot-
ers,” RealTime Economic Issues Watch, June 10, 2010, available at www.piie.
com/realtime,
23. See Valentina Pop, “Germany sets EU example with €80bn austerity pack-
age,” euobserver.com, June 8, 2010, available at http://euobserver.com. 
24. FT Markets Data: Bonds and Rates Overview, June 9, 2010, available at 
If Greece is ultimately forced to default on 
its debts, it is certain the Greek government 
would want to do it within the eurozone.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 4   j u Ne   2 0 1 0
6
to also be applied to most private creditors in the country in 
question in the form of higher costs of capital, put private 
business in, for instance, France in an unacceptable competi-
tive position in the long run versus German competitors inside 
the EU Internal Market.
In  the  eurozone,  where  sovereign  default  premia  are 
rapidly applied to fiscally weaker members, the ability of a 
German fiscal policy focused on austerity to forcefully dictate 
similar fiscal policies in other member states, including France, 
via financial-market pressure has grown dramatically. As such, 
the German domestic Constitutional Clause25 for a balanced 
budget will prove to have strong future “extraterritorial impli-
cations” outside Germany within the eurozone.
The fact that the ECB have gotten such unprecedented 
policy initiatives “in return” from member states to its novel 
actions  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  grand  bargain 
should further address concerns about the credibility of the 
ECB on price stability. At a time when European governments 
are legislating wage reductions and finally aggressively address-
ing their fiscal deficits and increasingly their structural growth 
barriers, too, worrying about inflation makes little sense.
So the question now becomes whether this new political 
commitment to a “new Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)” in 
whatever shape or form it will ultimately take will be any more 
credible than it was in 1997 (when the 60 percent debt stock 
criteria was abandoned) or in 2004 (when the big eurozone 
countries  France  and  Germany  undermined  the  3  percent 
deficit criteria)? It’s early days, but the signs from Madrid and 
elsewhere so far are good. A probable future Greek default 
will furthermore illustrate to anyone in Europe just what the 
horrible result of noncompliance will be; the political cost of 
running  unsustainable  fiscal  policies  will  rise—both  at  the 
eurozone level and domestically. Seeing what will happen to 
fiscally wayward countries is certain to shock European elec-
torates and fundamentally alter what kind of fiscal policies are 
politically feasible in Europe. 
http://markets.ft.com/markets/bonds.asp.
25. In 2009 Germany changed Article 115, II, in the German Constitu-
tion concerning government finances to include the clause: “Revenue and 
expenditure are principally to be balanced without revenues from credits. This 
principle is satisfied if revenues from credits do not exceed 0.35 percent in 
relation to the nominal gross domestic product.” The federal government is 
exempt from this clause until December 31, 2015, while German state govern-
ments are exempt until December 31, 2019. Text from German Constitution, 
available at www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/gm00000_.html.
Moreover, now that the days of phony eurozone govern-
ment bond yield convergence are gone for good and financial 
markets  happily  and  rapidly  apply  very  significant  default 
premia on irresponsible eurozone countries, the “new SGP” 
will get a real time financial-market enforcer that the old one 
never had. The “new SGP” will not have to just rely on the 
failed “EU political peer pressure” that undermined the pros-
pects of the original. 
Put another way, the European house will remain “half-
built,” but from the “grand bargain” the world gets to find out 
whether this is a fundamentally flawed design and whether all 
the “optimal currency area” advocates are right or not, or if 
Europe’s experiment with monetary union without political 
union merely requires that countries actually stick to the rules. 
Some  might  argue  that  suddenly  relying  on  global 
financial markets to enforce Europe’s commitment to future 
austerity is akin to relying on a manic-depressive policeman 
demanding too much austerity one day, only to look the other 
way the next. That risk certainly exists. However, given the 
already high levels of public debt in many eurozone countries, 
the  continent’s  low  potential  growth  rate  and  accelerating 
demographic decline in particularly the Eastern and Southern 
parts, it seems highly unlikely that anything other than deci-
sive government austerity measures to address Europe’s public 
debt problems will cause bond market vigilantes to turn their 
attention elsewhere. 
Moreover, the significant risk for junior private bond-
holders that very sizable haircuts will be imposed on them 
in any future Greek debt default/restructuring could further 
sharpen financial markets’ intention to enforce future govern-
ment  debt  sustainability  in  Europe.  As  such,  ironically,  a 
possible Greek debt default might significantly aid the long-
term success of Europe’s austerity-driven “fiscal straitjacket.” 
Apart from imposing severe losses on junior private Greek 
debt holders, such an event would further reduce future risks 
of moral hazard in the eurozone by illustrating the European 
Union’s  willingness  to  “let  insolvent  countries  go,”  while 
acting  to  protect  only  the  general  European  interest  and 
solvent members from the associated contagion.
Lastly, it would be a mistake at this early stage to rule out 
the possibility that on-going EU efforts led by EU Council 
President Herman van Rompuy to reform the SGP—clearly 
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headed toward significantly more forceful political implemen-
tation of the SGP with potentially automatic sanctions against 
fiscally wayward countries—will produce a political institu-
tion far more credible than its failed predecessor. In such a 
scenario, the SGP would go from not being enforced during 
its first decade either politically by the EU leaders or economi-
cally by financial markets to suddenly being enforced by both.
BEttEr FEarEd than LovEd is truE For 
CurrEnCy unions, too
After the May 2010 grand bargain, the eurozone will conse-
quently remain without a central transfer mechanism to over-
come future geographically concentrated “asymmetric shocks.” 
Combined with continuing low levels of actual labor mobility 
across member state borders (or often even within them), the 
European institutional framework will therefore for the fore-
seeable future remain at odds with several of the theoretically 
identified basic tenets of an optimal currency area (OCA).26 
However, while the OCA theory has without a doubt 
been useful in identifying the weaknesses in the existing euro-
zone institutional framework until now, and as such can be 
said to have predicted the euro’s current difficulties, it is worth 
remembering that OCA theory predicted in the first place 
that the euro would never happen. Correspondingly, it is not 
surprising that OCA-based predictions today still suggest that 
the euro is bound to fail. Such predictions, though, should be 
dismissed, especially those premised on the lack of a Keynes-
ian “central transfer mechanism” in the eurozone. 
Instead, as discussed above, from now on Europe will hold 
its currency union together through a “fiscal straitjacket” and 
the  willingness  to  endure  difficult  economic  times  to  avoid 
another  Greek  scenario.  In  that  sense,  Europeans  watching 
Greece,  similar  to  Brazilians  watching  Argentina’s  fate  after 
2001, will now be willing to accept tight fiscal policies and 
hitherto unacceptable social reforms. While this type of struc-
tural reforms, like labor market and pension reforms in Spain 
or increases in retirement age in France and elsewhere, will lead 
to some improvement in the potential growth rate in the long 
term, the eurozone will remain far from an OCA as it is defined 
by economic theory, and membership will be associated with 
significant costs for particularly Southern peripheral countries. 
Continuously at risk of asymmetric economic shocks, but 
without the monetary policy tool and from now on largely 
without fiscal policy, too, peripheral eurozone members whose 
business cycles are not closely aligned with those of the large 
26. See Mundell (1961) for the original description of the optimal currency 
area theory. 
core member states will have to “overinsure” against the asym-
metry of euro membership through exceptionally sustainable 
fiscal policies and flexible, innovation-oriented, procompeti-
tive social models. In short, all peripheral eurozone members 
will now have to become a lot more like, say, Finland.
However, there is no chance that the eurozone will break 
up as a result of the current economic crisis and in the long 
term from the effects of the grand bargain. First of all, leav-
ing  the  euro  will  come  at  catastrophic  cost  to  any  nation 
that tries to do so out of economic weakness. Even eurozone 
countries that go into default will be far better off doing so 
inside the eurozone than outside (crucially eurozone members 
cannot be kicked out), as they will still have access to the deep 
liquid eurozone financial markets in the long term. Any euro-
denominated interest rate imposed by financial markets even 
after a default will be a lot lower than interest rates on “new 
drachma denominated bonds.”27 
Moreover, a unilateral desire to leave the eurozone under 
the  existing  Lisbon  Treaty  would  require  that  a  eurozone 
member  to  quit  the  European  Union  entirely.  This  would 
entail near complete regional political isolation for the coun-
try in question, and in all probability it will also be suddenly 
subject to the European Union’s external trade barriers.
Further, it is important to note that ditching a physical 
currency that remains the legal tender in other countries is 
very different from simply breaking a currency peg, as Argen-
tina did in 2001. As the introduction of euro notes and coins 
showed in 2002, a new physical currency involves a drawn-
out, month-long logistical operation in order to empty and 
refill all automated teller machines, etc., which cannot be kept 
secret from the public. During this period, any country wish-
ing to leave the euro and reintroduce a new weaker national 
currency  would  experience  a  devastating  capital  flight,  as 
private residents would rush to transfer their money out of the 
country prior to the switch to a new weaker currency.28
While the argument can be made that quitting the euro 
after a sovereign default has already caused the almost inevi-
table collapse of the domestic banking system would not add 
much to the already existing economic chaos and hence would 
be potentially possible,29 this view ignores several important 
issues. First, there is a lot more to an economy than the bank-
ing system, and leaving the euro for a weaker currency would 
essentially cast all private contracts originally denominated in 
27. See also Buiter (2010) for an in-depth discussion of the preference for a 
Greek default within the eurozone.
28. See Eichengreen (2007) for the original formulation of this argument. 
29. See, for instance, Paul Krugman, “How Reversible Is the Euro?” The 
Conscience of a Liberal, April 28, 2010, available at http://krugman.blogs.
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euros into default or face rapidly rising liabilities through a 
depreciating “new drachma.” Second, countries that seek to 
reintroduce  a  new  national  currency  must  have  reasonable 
expectations of large export gains from a competitive devalu-
ation. However, in the case of Greece (and essentially all of 
the Mediterranean eurozone members, with Italy as the partial 
exception), large export gains from even a large competitive 
devaluation look very unlikely. 
As I described in a recent PIIE RealTime piece, with a total 
“goods export intensity” of just 7 percent of GDP in 2008, 
Greece is by far the least goods export oriented country in the 
eurozone.30 The country fundamentally makes very little that 
the rest of the world wants to benefit much from the short-
term pricing advantages of reintroducing its own currency. 
Moreover, Greece’s two large services sectors—tourism and 
shipping—are  highly  sensitive  to  social  unrest  (guaranteed 
with  the  introduction  of  a  new  drachma)  and  conducted 
almost wholly in US dollars for both revenues and costs. These 
sectors also are unlikely to benefit much from a competitive 
Greek devaluation. The economic gains for Greece associated 
with leaving the eurozone thus are like the Sirens—seductive 
but mythical.
Similar misconceptions exist about the willingness and 
possibility of the eurozone anchor country, Germany, leav-
ing the eurozone. It is politically unthinkable that Germany 
would undermine 60 years of pro-European policies by leav-
ing  the  eurozone  and  thereby  destroy  the  entire  European 
Union, which has anchored its identity and powered its post-
war authority. Recall that the German parliament drew broad 
political support for the recent €750 billion EFSF from both 
the  governing  CDU-FDP  coalition  and  the  main  opposi-
tion parties SPD/Green Party. That backing came despite the 
potential price tag of more than €150 billion for Germany. 
The SPD/Green Party abstained in the vote only because of 
30. Jacob F. Kirkegaard, “The Role of External Demand in the Eurozone,” 
RealTime Economics Issues, May 27, 2010, available at www.piie.com. Greece 
exported for more than €500 million in just four HS six-digit categories 
in 2008; light petroleum distillates (HS271019), bulk medical supplies 
(HS300490), fresh fish (HS030269), and “other” (HS999999). Data are from 
UN Comtrade Database, available at http://comtrade.un.org.
opposition  to  the  lack  of  private-sector  involvement  (i.e., 
pain for the banks) in the package.31 In other words, only a 
Germany ruled solely by the far left party, Die Linke, which 
received just 11.9 percent of the vote in the 2009 German 
national elections, would conceivably oppose current policies. 
This broad political support among the German political 
parties matters. German politicians are elected by proportion-
al representation, a system that awards power to smaller and 
bigger political parties. Financial markets fearing a departure 
from the eurozone by Germany, where the euro is admittedly 
more and more unpopular, still attach far too much impor-
tance to single-issue polls on this issue. 
The experience of European countries32 that have under-
gone popular referenda on EU-related issues is that whereas 
voters reject the recommendations of their elected politicians 
on such matters, there is next to no impact on how they vote in 
the next general election. There is no reason to believe that the 
German electorate is different. Polls showing public dissatisfac-
tion with the euro will not likely lead to a massive swing of 
voters to Die Linke or a new “anti-EU protest party” in the next 
German election. The polls can therefore be largely ignored.
There is a striking contrast between the power of popu-
list  fringe  groups  in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Many 
American commentators accustomed to the ability of populist 
groups  to  win  in  closed  winner-take-all  primaries—as  the 
Tea  Party  candidates  have  done  this  year—underestimate 
the stabilizing political effect of proportional representation 
in Europe. Commentators also underestimate the electorate’s 
and the government’s deeply institutionalized attachment to 
the European Union, which will make it harder to attract 
the popular majority required in proportional representation 
systems in support of an EU pullout. In essence, Europe’s 
political systems today are far more elitist than that of the 
United States, which is crucial when thinking about the risk 
of populist policies actually being implemented.
Moreover, as has forcefully been argued by Adam Posen 
recently,  Germany  retains  huge  economic  advantages  from 
being in the eurozone in the form of seigniorage, deeper bond 
markets, and the inability of close trading partners to deval-
ue.33 Add hereto the €972 billion (data from end 2010Q1) in 
German bank exposure to other eurozone countries, of which 
€355 billion pertains to Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as 
of end-March 2010.34 All of these claims would be severely 
31. See “Merkel Pushes Euro Rescue Deal Through Parliament,” Speigel 
Online International, May 21, 2010, available at www.spiegel.de. 
32. Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, France, and the Netherlands.
33. Adam Posen, “Having a Large Euro Area Is an Advantage for Germany,” 
op-ed in Die Welt, February 19, 2010, available at www.piie.com.
34. Data are from the Deutsche Bundesbank, available at www.bundesbank.de. 
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impaired, were the other eurozone countries to reintroduce 
their own weaker currencies, adding intolerable strain to an 
already weak German banking system. Destroying the euro-
zone  would  therefore  destroy  the  German  banking  system 
far more completely than any Greek default could achieve. 
In summary, the economic, as well as the political, case for a 
German departure from the eurozone is nonexistent.
Yet,  while  the  eurozone  won’t  break  under  the  strain 
of the current crisis, it will nonetheless be a very different 
eurozone after the grand bargain, especially in its Southern 
part.  Originally  designed  as  the  ultimate  symbol  of  Euro-
pean monetary integration and the firm foundation of rapid 
economic growth in the Southern peripheral members that 
would deliver convergence in living standards with the richer 
Northern parts of Europe, from now on the euro will have no 
such positive vision associated with it. Rather than economic 
growth and rising living standards, the euro will now extend 
a damp deflationary—potentially even Thatcherite—embrace 
to its Mediterranean members, forcing their leaders to legislate 
lower public wages and overhaul their social and economic 
models to avoid the catastrophic Greek-like debt spiral. But as 
mentioned above, the eurozone will hold together, though no 
longer by a positive vision of the common future but by the 
realization of the staggering cost of leaving.
As Machiavelli wrote on whether it is better for a ruler to 
be loved than feared:
“It may be answered that it…is much safer to be feared 
than loved…. because friendships that are obtained by 
payments…are not secured, and in time of need cannot 
be relied upon;… but fear preserves you by a dread of 
punishment which never fails.”35
As with princes, so too with currency unions made up of 
democratic nations. It will prove far safer to have the euro held 
together by elected governments fearful of the cost of leaving 
and consequently willing to do whatever it takes to avoid this 
outcome than relying on excessively low cost of capital from a 
spurious convergence of government bond yields upon entry 
35. Niccolò Machiavelli, “Chapter XVII: Concerning Cruelty and Clemency, 
and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved than Feared,” in The Prince, written c. 
1505, published 1515. 
to produce unsustainable short-term bursts of growth in the 
periphery. This is true for weaker eurozone states, as well as for 
Germany, which has proven willing to shoulder much of the 
economic burden of this crisis solution once again. The euro 
is therefore safer today than ever, and the only change in the 
eurozone will come through expansion, starting with Estonia 
in 2011.36
What MorE is nEEdEd For thE EurozonE
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), associated bank 
stress-tests,  and  not  least  the  Fall  2008  US  political  crisis 
management process that led to these initiatives being first 
rejected before they were ultimately passed by the US House 
of Representatives were widely ridiculed at the time. Today, 
however, most observers would probably agree that that these 
measures ultimately played a large and constructive role in 
containing the immediate financial-market crisis contagion in 
the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In time, 
Europe’s grand bargain on May 9–10, 2010 to the Greek crisis 
will come to be viewed in a similar positive light. 
The negative short-term effects on European economic 
growth of the grand bargain and the associated spillover into 
the European private sector from new public austerity measures 
are obvious, and despite the positive long-term impact of these 
policies, much still remains to be done for Europe’s policy-
makers to ensure that they do not let the current crisis to go to 
waste. At least three issues stand out.
First,  European  governments  must  immediately  begin 
to  address  the  uncertainties  surrounding  capital  adequacy 
of the eurozone banking system.37 Despite the ECB recently 
estimating a potential €195 billion in eurozone banks’ loan 
writedowns during the 18 months from June 2010 to Decem-
ber 2011 (ECB 2010, box 11), these estimates do not include 
any assumptions regarding the potential costs of a probable 
Greek sovereign default, which will with certainty be severe 
for  junior  private  creditors  (Mussa  2010).  More  action  is 
urgently needed. 
Transparent stress-tests of all large and complex banking 
groups in the eurozone must therefore, in a manner not dissimi-
lar to the US process in early 2009, be conducted immediately 
by  national  eurozone  regulatory  authorities  to  identify  the 
weakest links. Aggressive campaigns to raise additional private 
capital (diluting existing shareholders) must be encouraged, and 
36. See European Commission (2010a) for its recommendation for Estonian 
euro membership starting in 2011. 
37. For a forceful articulation of this important point, see Nicolas Veron, “EU 
Inaction Over Banks Grow Ever Costlier,” RealTime Economic Issues Watch, 
May 18, 2010, available at www.piie.com/realtime. 
European governments must immediately 
begin to address the uncertainties 
surrounding capital adequacy of 
the eurozone banking system.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 4   j u Ne   2 0 1 0
10
national eurozone governments must be willing, ultima ratio, 
to recapitalize severely stricken banks where additional private 
capital is unavailable in return for ownership status. 
Without sound private banking systems, even the most 
sound  government  finances  will  not  provide  any  benefits 
to general economic growth and indeed leave Europe at risk 
of suffering the fate of Japan’s lost decade (the decade from   
economic  crisis  in  the  early  1990s  until  Heizo  Takenaka’s 
cleanup of Japanese banks after 2002). As such, governments in 
Germany and elsewhere in the eurozone bent on restoring over-
all fiscal austerity must expeditiously spend the required govern-
ment resources to ensure that the eurozone banking system is 
sound and well capitalized. 
A likely last integral part of “stress-testing” of the euro-
zone banking system will be to work out a negotiated process 
through which Greece can default on its debts with minimal 
risk of serious contagion effects. Here the role of the ECB, 
which will by now have a substantial exposure to Greek govern-
ment debt through its collateral program and the new SMP, will 
be critical.38
Second, implementation is what matters now. It is crucial 
that eurozone governments, particularly among the Southern 
members, deliver expeditiously on the austerity and not least 
structural reform commitments recently made. Spain, Portugal, 
and to a lesser extent Italy must now clearly draw a line between 
themselves and Greece in terms of both their fiscal sustainability 
and growth prospects. Particularly the latter will require addi-
tional pro-growth structural reforms. 
However, as the entire eurozone will be putting on its new 
“fiscal straitjacket” and therefore—in addition to its previous 
loss  of  an  independent  monetary  policy—will  face  severely 
restricted  future  fiscal  policy  room  for  maneuver,  the  entire 
eurozone must double efforts towards raising potential growth 
rates through structural reforms. National foci will vary among 
38. For more details on the ECB’s role in this process, see Jacob F. Kirkegaard, 
“The European Central Bank Calms the Storm—for Now,” RealTime 
Economic Issues Watch, May 4, 2010, available at www.piie.com/realtime 
and Jacob F. Kirkegaard, “The Biggest Losers: Who Gets Hurt from a Greek 
Default or Restructuring,” RealTime Economic Issues Watch, April 27, 2010, 
available at www.piie.com/realtime.
individual member states—labor markets and pension systems 
in Spain, consolidation of regional Landesbanken and reform 
of the entire education system and services sectors in Germany, 
and pension system reforms in France—while at the EU level, 
completion of the Internal Market in Services is priority.
Third and only for the long term, the eurozone should 
consider  introducing  a  potential  “carrot”  for  members  that 
successfully  manage  to  put  their  government  finances  on  a 
sustainable path. This carrot could come in the form of a future 
common  “Maastricht  bond,”  similar  to  the  often  suggested 
“eurobond,”  but  open  only  to  eurozone  member  states  that 
actually adhere to the Maastricht Treaty debt stock criteria of a 
maximum level of government debt of 60 percent over an entire 
business  cycle.  A  Maastricht  bond  would  furthermore  have 
“living will provision,” enabling the expeditious expulsion from 
any Maastricht bond of countries that during the duration of 
the bond fail to adhere to the debt and other eligibility criteria.
Evidently, such a future Maastricht bond would in all like-
lihood be possible only with the participation of Germany and 
a critical number of eurozone members (French participation 
would not be strictly required, although preferable) as launch-
ing participants. Moreover, a Maastricht bond would through 
the opportunity to lock in lower interest rates from deeper and 
more liquid bond markets offer a powerful incentive for other 
eurozone countries to come into and remain in compliance with 
the Maastricht Treaty debt criteria. As such, a Maastricht bond 
would work toward the same goal as the EU Commission’s 
recent proposals to reform the SGP39 and go a long way toward 
avoiding  the  moral  hazard  concerns  that  have  traditionally 
politically blocked the introduction of eurobonds, particularly 
in Germany. With only eurozone members that have roughly 
comparable government finances and adhere to the Maastricht 
debt stock criteria eligible, any deterioration in the national 
lending conditions of, for instance, Germany from participating 
in a joint Maastricht bond with other eligible countries would 
be very small. Including only roughly comparable countries in 
the joint Maastricht bond therefore greatly reduces the risk of 
moral hazard among the participating countries. 
From  a  global  perspective,  successful  introduction  of  a 
pan-European Maastricht bond by the end of the decade, at a 
time when the US federal government debt on current “busi-
ness as usual” projections will be well above 100 percent of US 
GDP, could have serious implications for the future “global safe-
haven” asset. At that point in time, a successfully launched pan-
European Maastricht Bond, backed by the credibility of years of 
painfully endured austerity measures across a sufficient number 
of participating member states, could achieve a scale and market 
39. See EU Commission (2010b, 5) for the suggestion that “the debt criterion 
[60%] of the excessive deficit procedure should effectively be implemented.”
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depth not far off today’s US treasury market. A European Maas-
tricht bond could consequently pose the first serious threat to an 
increasingly fragile US treasury market as the “global safe haven” 
asset —a threat that if deemed credible might again prove to be 
the final push for the US Congress to get serious about dealing 
with the long-term US debt sustainability concerns. 
Ironically, European austerity measures would then have 
been what ultimately politically enabled new US federal govern-
ment revenue increases.
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